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Introduction
Th e involvement of children in armed forces or groups has been documented across many continents and confl icts. Th e number of children associated with armed or fi ghting forces around the world has been estimated to be as high as 300,000 (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008). Th ese children are often subjected to a wide variety of abuses including torture, sexual violence, drug use, and coercion.
Yet, it is important to understand that children associated with armed forces or groups have widely varying experiences (Wessells 2007) . Some children join armed forces or fi ghting groups for survival purposes; others are forcibly abducted. Some children spend many years with armed forces or groups; others may return home after a few hours. Some children are actively engaged in armed combat; many others take on roles such as porters, spies or cooks (Stark et al. 2009a) . Th e broad range of confl ict-related activities in which a child may engage is codifi ed in the recently developed Paris Principles, which defi ne a child associated with armed groups and fi ghting forces as … any person below eighteen years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fi ghter, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities (UNICEF 2007: 36) .
Girls-who have been estimated to make up as many as 40 percent of children associated with armed and fi ghting forces (Save the Children UK 2005)-may face unique challenges, especially when reintegrating into communities following the end of a confl ict. As the Paris Principles explain:
Girls face specifi c consequences from their time in armed forces or armed groups. Th e stigma facing girls is fundamentally diff erent in kind-it lasts much longer, is critically more diffi cult to reduce and is more severe. Essentially, many girls will have lost their 'value', as perceived by the community including in relation to marriage.… In addition, a girl will often have to deal with residual relationships or feeling for her captor, as he may be both her 'husband' and the father of her child or children (UNICEF 2007 Article 7: 59) .
Girls returning from life with armed forces thus rejoin their communities as stigmatized individuals, and are often denied necessary supports to help them attain normative markers of development such as marriage, having children, and fi nancial independence. Many of the complexities described above were documented in the aftermath of the decade-long confl ict in Sierra Leone. While there were many factors that contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in 1991, the violence was sparked by Fodeh Saybana Sankoh, a Libyan-taught revolutionary whose mentor and military backer was the then war-lord, Charles Taylor. Th e Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Sankoh, deposed General Joseph Momoh, whose All People's Congress had ruled for twenty-four of the thirty-four years since independence from Britain in 1961. Th e RUF went on to wage one of the most brutal campaigns ever against civilians. Th ey destroyed homes and entire communities. As one observer summarized, "I don't know how organized it was, but it was certainly systematic. Th ere was an intent to really rip apart the communities, and it worked" (Walsh 2002:11) .
One of the defi ning features of the civil war in Sierra Leone was the use of children as combatants. Taylor and Sankoh "created armies of child soldiers…torn from their parents, enslaved to drugs and trained to murder and maim civilians in campaigns calculated to inculcate mass terror" (Kelly 2000:A23) . Th roughout the confl ict, children "voluntarily" took part as combatants. As one child described, "In Sierra Leone, a gun isn't just cool, it is a means of survival. Th ere are no jobs, anyway. With a gun, you get food, respect and girls" (Smith 2000:15) . With both the RUF and fi ghting forces aligned with the government engaged in extensive forced, under-age recruitment, many thousands of children were engaged in the confl ict. Child soldiers constituted approximately one third of the rebel forces that helped to overthrow the elected government. Of these, a large number were girls (McKay and Mazurana 2004) who experienced extensive sexual abuse and exploitation.
Th e [rebels] perpetrated systematic, organized and widespread sexual violence against girls and women. Th e rebels planned and launched operations in which they rounded up girls and women, brought them to rebel command centers and then subjected them to individual and gang rape. Young girls under seventeen, and particularly those deemed to be virgins were specifi cally targeted. While some were released or managed to escape, hundreds continue to be held in sexual slavery after being 'married' to rebel combatants (Farah 2000:A1) .
Girls witnessed the murder of family members, had their homes burned to the ground, were forcibly separated from their families, and suff ered rape and sexual violence at the hands of their captors. Most served as cooks, porters, and laborers. Many also participated in the fi ghting where they looted, killed and committed other atrocities (Stark 2006) .
In the formal disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process in Sierra Leone, girls associated with armed groups and forces were largely overlooked and excluded. At the time of the offi cial demobilization, many girls were not released by their abductors or failed to come forward out of shame or fear. In addition, many girls who had been combatants could not pass the offi cial 'weapons test' in which a child turns in a weapon after demonstrating her or his knowledge of how to disassemble and reassemble it. According to the testimony of one girl:
Many girls who were combatants during the war were not given the opportunity by their captors (bush husbands) to benefi t from the NCDDR package. Some bush husbands dispossessed them of their weapons, when they realized that handing over guns to the authorities meant some compensation. Th ose girls who were dispossessed of their guns were not able to go through the programs designed for them, and have not been bold enough to talk. Th ere are others who had the opportunity to be demobilized, but because they were ashamed of their roles in the jungle, they did not come forward and therefore did not benefi t from the program (Bayoh 2004:13) .
Another girl who narrated her experience shared the following with a reporter:
She had left the jungle in the year 2000, but was so preoccupied with her past experience that she did not see the need to seek help. She only realized that she needed help when all men who came in contact with her for relationship left her suddenly because they discovered that she had a very severe sexually transmitted infection (Bayoh 2004:13) .
Only 506 of an estimated total in excess of 12,000 girl soldiers participated in the offi cial DDR process. Th is estimated DDR participation rate of 4 percent compares very poorly to an estimated 18 percent for boys who had been associated with armed forces or armed groups (McKay and Mazurana 2004) .
Formerly recruited girls and young women emerged from the war with both physical and emotional wounds. Many girls contracted sexually transmitted diseases during their time with armed groups and forces (Farah 2000) . Girls commonly reported feelings of hopelessness, worthlessness and despair (Farah 2000; Stark 2006 ). Reintegration has proven extremely diffi cult and has exacerbated the wounds of these girls and young women. Th ey have been stigmatized by their families and communities who perceived them as impure as a result of the sexual abuse. Returning girls were verbally and physically attacked, restricted from mingling with family and community and prohibited from marrying. Th eir spiritual pollution was believed to cause misfortune, bad harvests and health problems for both the girls and the broader community.
Beginning in 2001 (as hostilities within the country began to draw to a close), Christian Children's Fund/Sierra Leone (CCF/Sierra Leone) initiated a program to support these girls and young women and to address some of the diffi culties they faced in rejoining their communities (CCF/Sierra Leone 2002) . Th e program, named Sealing the Past, Facing the Future (SEFAFU), began by listening to girls and community members to seek to understand what pre-existing supports could be built upon to help the girls reintegrate into civilian life (Abdul-Shereef et al. 2006) . Based on these conversations, CCF developed a varied package of supports for the girls and young women, and the broader community.
One of the main supports off ered was access to traditional cleansing ceremonies. Th ese cleansings were seen as a local means of washing away the evils of wartime experiences (Stark 2006) . Cleansings were led by local spiritual healers. Th ey began with a short period of retreat from the village, during which time the girls and young women sang and cooked together. Th ere then followed a ritual washing of each participant. Th e ceremonies concluded with a community-wide celebration to symbolize the re-entry of the girls and young women into the community (AbdulShereef 2006) . Cleansings were perceived to be an eff ective way for former female soldiers to rid themselves of their stigmatized status, physical and psychological health problems and social exclusion.
Th e SEFAFU program also facilitated and paid for the medical treatment of sexually transmitted infections, with a 2002 assessment having indicated that more than 90 percent of girls and young women who had experienced abduction had contracted such infections. A further program component was the provision of skills-training and microcredit so that girls had the fi nancial resources to return to school, help support their own children or develop other capacities and resources. Skills-training focused on such activities as soap-making, tie-dyeing and crocheting. Loans were generally for one year, to a value of approximately seventy-fi ve dollars US, with monthly repayments and interest at 10 percent payable. In addition to supporting activities related to the foci of skills-training, loans facilitated business activities ranging from sewing to rice-hulling and produce trading. Th e program additionally involved awareness-raising activities to help the broader community better understand the situation of the returning girls. In particular, eff orts were made to help community members understand that the girls themselves had suff ered, since communities tended to view as perpetrators anyone who had been part of the groups that had attacked villages.
Th is program has been suggested as a model of good practice in post-confl ict programming for girls formerly associated with armed groups and fi ghting forces (Stark et al. 2009a ). However, despite encouraging qualitative reports from program participants (Kostelny 2008) , there has been, to date, no rigorous evaluation of the impact of the program. Indeed, there were severe practical constraints on mounting such an evaluation. Th ere was, for example, no explicit baseline data collected regarding the experience and circumstances of the participants in the program, nor were the explicit indicators of reintegration defi ned. Additionally, funding restrictions had resulted in the delivery of intervention components with varying completeness and in diff ering orders. Most challenging of all was the time that had elapsed since the girls' abductions, their return and receipt of the interventions (with the program transitioning from 2006 into integrated work on long-term community development).
Th e Care and Protection of Children (CPC) in Crisis Settings 1 initiative was established to seek to develop fi eld-friendly methodologies to strengthen the evidence-base for humanitarian programming in post-confl ict and other situations of crisis. CPC researchers worked with CCF colleagues to develop and implement a methodology to evaluate the impact of the SEFAFU intervention in Koinadugu District, one of the target areas for CCF's work using this approach in the period from 2002 to 2007.
Methodology
Design Th e research team conducted a retrospective cohort study, analyzing how well girls formerly associated with armed groups had reintegrated into their communities. Th e team visited communities that had participated in CCF's SEFAFU intervention and collected information from girls who had been in receipt of SEFAFU support. Th e team also identifi ed matched communities within the District that had not been reached by the SEFAFU intervention (for which coverage had been constrained by funding limitations) and interviewed girls who would have been eligible for SEFAFU support had it been available. Th e research examined whether the SEFAFU program accelerated the reintegration of girls into their communities by looking at the time from return from abduction to the attainment of defi ned reintegration outcomes.
Measures
Data was collected through in-depth structured individual interviews on six culturally specifi c indicators of reintegration: marriage, schooling, community acceptance (marked by invitation to community events), inclusion in bondo societies, 2 cessation of drug use, and attainment of steady head-the locally accepted measure of mental stability. Th ese indicators were established as representing the perceptions of successful community reintegration by formerly abducted girls and women through fi eldwork utilizing participative ranking methodology (Ager et al. 2010a ). Fourteen participative discussions-involving a total of 166 girls and young women-were convened in communities across Koinadugu and the neighboring districts of Port Loko and Bombali. Using a modifi ed form of 'free listing', discussions identifi ed characteristics that girls and young women considered to be signs of having eff ectively reintegrated within communities following the experience of abduction. Participative ranking was then used to develop a consensus prioritization of these characteristics. Th is work, completed three months in advance of data collection, is more fully reported elsewhere (Stark et al. 2009b) .
Data was also collected on length of abduction, age at abduction and a range of demographic variables. Experiences during abduction were noted but, given the focus of the research and the potential intrusion involved in recall of such activity, this was not a major focus of questioning.
Th e design required recall of the timing of major personal events by participants. Th e dating of such events was challenged by both the signifi cant passage of time and the low levels of literacy amongst participants. Th e team thus worked with communities, in semi-structured focus groups, to construct a local time-line of signifi cant events from the end of the war to the period of the interviews. Focus groups included a cross-section of village leaders (chief, mammy queen, 3 assistant chiefs, and elders), educated people (local teachers, youth group leaders and village mobilizers) and youth, including young girls. Th e full process was repeated in all communities in order to ensure that selected events were meaningful to the girls interviewed. Events included on the calendars were occurrences-agricultural, ceremonial, political, remarkable-that were judged memorable by a majority of the focus group members. Examples of events included "the time when the only daughter of the chief died in childbirth", "when fl oods washed away the [local] bridge", and "when the UN helicopter blew the roof off the school". Th e constructed time line was then used during the interview process to locate the attainment of specifi ed indicators as closely as possible in time. (See Table 1 for an example of one completed timeline.)
Research Setting
Th e research was conducted in the Koinadugu District of Sierra Leone in the summer of 2007. 4 Koinadugu was signifi cantly impacted by the civil war and, located as it is in the far northeast with major areas inaccessible by road, is one of the least developed Districts of the country. Sierra Leone as a whole continues to rank amongst the least developed nations with respect to such measures as the United Nations Human Development Index (UNDP 2008).
Sample
Th e sample comprised 142 girls-seventy-four from intervention communities and sixty-eight from comparison communities. Th e sample size was based upon a power calculation targeting the drawing of comparisons regarding the eff ectiveness of the intervention with at least 80 percent confi dence, assuming an eff ect size of 0.30 (Bamberger et al. 2006) . All participants were aged between seventeen and twenty-fi ve years at the time of interview and had been abducted and held by an armed group or military personnel for at least twenty-four hours.
Intervention communities comprised all communities in the Dis trict where the SEFAFU program had been active prior to 2005. Simple random sampling was used in intervention communities, with SEFAFU enrollment lists-documenting girls who had received at least one component of the program-used as the sampling frame. Fifteen girls per community were initially invited to take part in the interview process. If girls did not attend the subsequent interview session, replacements were selected from the enrollment list by random sampling.
Comparison communities were villages that had not received the SEFAFU intervention but were in similar geographic locations within the District, of similar size and within similar proximity to towns and roads. Although Koinadugu was not a District with intensive NGO activity, girls in the comparison group were screened prior to interviews and were excluded from the sample if they had received a loan, skills-training, or medical care (i.e. key components of the SEFAFU intervention) from some other organization. However, girls in comparison communities were still included if they had received a cleansing through the eff orts of their family, friends and/or community since this was viewed as a traditional coping mechanism and not an externally initiated activity. Because a sampling frame did not exist in comparison communities, census sampling was used. In an eff ort to avoid stigmatizing girls who had been abducted, the researchers invited all girls between the ages of seventeen and twenty-fi ve to be interviewed. Th e girls were then individually screened on the interview day, with only girls who had been abducted asked to complete the full interview.
Procedure
All participants in the research were given the option not to participate, without negative repercussion, and were asked to provide oral consent before the start of the interview. All participants gave their consent to the interview. Th e interviews, which typically lasted in the order of one hour, were conducted using a structured questionnaire. Interviews were conducted in settings in which discussions could not be overheard by others. Th ey were conducted by an interviewer and translator, who both had extensive experience discussing sensitive issues in a supportive manner.
Key demographic information was recorded and the estimated date at which each indicator of reintegration had, if at all, been (fi rst) attained. Interviewers made use of the community calendars to estimate such timing, with frequent cross-referencing of the time of each event for verifi cation purposes. For girls reporting to be married, additional questions were asked on the quality of that marriage (with regard both to specifi c behaviors of the husband and an overall judgment of it being a 'good' or 'bad' marriage).
Participants were not pressured to share emotionally disturbing experiences. Girls were told how they could contact CCF (who had ongoing programming in the area) if they found that the interviews brought up diffi cult memories. All those interviewed were compensated for their time (away from agricultural or other work) with a package of rice, cooking fat and fl avoring.
Analytical Methods
Analysis was based upon the elapsed time between a girl's return from abduction to the time of her attainment of each of the identifi ed indicators of reintegration. Th e initial basis of comparison between intervention and comparison communities was the cumulative percentage of girls having attained each indicator after their return.
Following initial analysis it was noted that a large percentage of girls had in fact attained targeted outcomes prior to the initiation of the SEFAFU program in their community. To address this confounding factor, girls in intervention communities who had not attained the outcome variable prior to intervention were matched with girls of the same age (who similarly had not attained that specifi ed outcome) in comparison communities. Age-matching was on the basis of age at the time of return being within two years of the proposed match. Th is process was completed for four outcome variables: marriage, community acceptance, bondo inclusion, and steady head. Such analysis was not completed on drug cessation because the signifi cantly smaller pool of girls available to match on such variables rendered comparisons invalid. Analysis was completed using Excel and Stata 9.0.
Results
Th e baseline indicators for girls from intervention (n=74) and comparison (n=68) communities are broadly well matched on the variables of age, length of abduction, and rates of drug use (see Table 2 ). Th ere was a trend for girls from comparison communities to have spent more time away from their village following release or escape from the armed forces or groups that had abducted them. In both intervention and comparison communities armed groups linked with the RUF were responsible for the majority of abductions. Chi-square analysis of reintegration outcomes across intervention and comparison communities at the time of interview (see Table 3 ) suggests only attainment of steady head as signifi cantly related to exposure to the intervention. Th ere are modest, non-signifi cant trends for higher rates of attainment of bondo inclusion and community acceptance in intervention communities at the time of interview, but no diff erence on the outcomes of drug cessation or achieving marriage. Table 4 reports responses by those married to questions regarding the quality of their marriage. On two indicators-provision of clothes by their husband and provision of medicines by their husband-girls who had been exposed to the SEFAFU intervention reported more favorable marriages.
Th e major positive fi nding from Table 3 , of course, is that by the time of interviews the majority of girls and young women, whether or not exposed to intervention, had attained outcomes indicative of reintegration. In this circumstance, the key issue thus becomes whether the intervention served to accelerate the attainment of such outcomes in communities receiving SEFAFU support. Figures 1 and 2 show, by way of illustration, the cumulative attainment of the outcomes of marriage and bondo acceptance respectively since return from the bush. Th e former suggests a slight trend towards marriages being secured earlier in comparison communities; the latter indicates initially similar rates of growth in bondo acceptance across comparison and intervention communities, but that in intervention communities then increasing. * Of these, fourteen girls were married before the war (date unknown); four of these girls ended their marriage (death or divorce) before their abduction. Time from return to second marriage was included for these four girls.
** Of these, seventeen girls were married before the war (date unknown); one of these girls ended her marriage (death or divorce) before her abduction. Time from return to second marriage was included for this girl. However, these are complex trends to interpret given that analysis is taken from the point of arrival back in communities and because the SEFAFU intervention was delivered at diff erent points of time in diff erent communities. A major consequence of this is that many girls reported having achieved one indicator, or more, of reintegration before their exposure to SEFAFU. For example, 63.5 percent of girls in SEFAFU communities had been married at some point prior to the intervention; 70.3 percent reported re-engaging with bondo activities before exposure to the program. Although these indicators had been suggested by young women and girls as appropriate measures of community reintegration there is some ambiguity in using them as a measure of intervention eff ectiveness.
As noted in the methodology section, analysis therefore proceeded, for each outcome indicator in turn, by removing from the analysis respondents who had attained that outcome before being fi rst exposed to some element of the SEFAFU intervention. Of the remaining girls in the intervention group, each was then matched with a girl of similar age from comparison communities who had also not attained that outcome prior to the matched girl's fi rst exposure to SEFAFU. Because of the very small number of girls who had not stopped their drug use prior the SEFAFU intervention (10.2 percent), matched comparisons were not possible on this outcome variable.
Th e sub-samples produced by this matching procedure were found to be broadly comparable on baseline factors, though there was somewhat greater variation than with the full sample (see Table 5 ). Th e greatest diff erence between groups was again on the time spent away from their village following release or escape. After developing matched samples for each outcome variable, chi-square analysis was completed. Th is indicated signifi cant impact of the intervention for all indicators except for the outcome of marriage (see Table 6 ). 
Discussion
Th e eff ect of confl ict on children has become a major humanitarian concern in the management of complex emergencies and in post-confl ict situations. However, signifi cant gaps continue to exist in provision for some of the most vulnerable children. Th is article presents an evaluation of one program seeking to address this gap for girls and young women formerly associated with armed groups or other fi ghting forces. Establishing a body of research on the best practices to address the needs of children and youth in and after confl ict is essential, both in providing the best care and in securing future support and funding for these activities and programs. Th is requires the development of research methodologies suited to the constraints and uncertainties of real world humanitarian situations. Th is research encountered signifi cant conceptual and methodological challenges. In contrast to the tendency of research and practice to rely on indicators developed by external actors, this research used indicators of reintegration suggested by the girls and young women themselves. However, one of the indicators-participation in bondo activities-raises a welter of questions and unresolved issues. On one hand, Sierra Leoneon girls view participation in bondo as essential for their well-being and as an expression of their womanhood, and to not participate is to lack a sense of identity and belonging (Ahmadu and Schweder 2009; Stark 2006) . On the other hand, participation in bondo may entail Female Genital Cutting (FGC), a practice that contradicts international human rights standards and that most Western humanitarians regard as a signifi cant child protection issue. In accepting participation in bondo societies as a participant-identifi ed indicator, we were not tacitly accepting the legitimacy of FGC but were recognizing its perceived importance to the girls and young women. During the course of the SEFAFU program, CCF/Sierra Leone had taken steps not to condone the practice of FGC by, for example, insuring that resources used for traditional cleansing ceremonies would not be used for such purposes. Th is approach, working respectfully with local cultural beliefs and practices but signaling clearly issues that contravene international human rights standards, appears to be emerging as the most promising long-term approach to addressing harmful traditional practices (Mackie and LeJeaune 2009) .
Th e methodological challenges faced were no less formidable. Th e research approach used to evaluate the SEFAFU program was by necessity innovative to overcome the constraints noted earlier regarding the lack of pre-determined indicators, the lack of baseline information regarding integration and the length of elapsed time since abduction, return and intervention. While the use of local calendars and participative ranking to defi ne local measures of reintegration addressed such concerns, there remain methodological constraints that need to be addressed in advance of interpretation of fi ndings. Th e most critical of these constraints are with regard to the matching of intervention and comparison communities, reliability of recall, and confounding factors related to the attainment of outcomes before exposure to intervention for signifi cant numbers of the sample.
First, although there was an attempt to select comparison communities that matched the intervention communities in terms of cultural and linguistic context, physical geography, size, proximity to towns and roads, there was clear diff erence between the communities with respect to the time that girls had spent away from their villages following release or escape from their abductors. If this diff erence refl ects diff erent conditions operating in comparison areas that further restricted opportunities for integration, this would be a source of bias in the design, artifi cially favoring outcomes in SEFAFU communities. Th ere is, however, no clear evidence for this, and it is possible to see such time away from the village as a further symptom of challenges in reintegration rather than a cause of such diffi culties.
Second, there are obvious challenges asking girls about what they experienced up to eight or nine years previously. Th e local calendars were found to be an eff ective method for identifying public occurrences with respect to which the date of personal events and experiences could be estimated, but the accuracy of these estimates is obviously likely to decrease with time. Such compromise in the estimation of the timing of events introduces a source of insensitivity that could result in an underestimation of the eff ects of the intervention. It is unlikely, however, to be a signifi cant source of bias, given that conditions constraining recall were similar for girls in the intervention and comparison samples.
Th ird, as discussed earlier, interpretation of rate of attainment of reintegration outcomes (such as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 ) is constrained by some confounding of outcome variables and exposure to the intervention. A signifi cant majority of SEFAFU girls interviewed had achieved targeted outcomes before exposure to any element of the program. Th is confounding is addressed with the matching procedure adopted, but at the cost of excluding large numbers of girls from this subsequent analysis. Th e population represented in these matched comparisons no longer represents a random selection but rather a targeted one, based upon failure to attain a specifi c outcome. As such, the fi ndings of impact should be taken to refl ect changes in girls who were experiencing the most diffi culty in achieving targeted integration outcomes rather than the general population of formerly abducted girls. Given that the girls who had not achieved targeted outcomes prior to the intervention were actually in the minority, this is a major constraint on interpretation. However, it is a constraint with positive operational signifi cance, given the objectives of the program to reach and support the most vulnerable girls.
Acknowledging the caution suggested by these constraints, the current study nonetheless suggests some important fi ndings related to the experiences and support of formerly abducted girls. First, there is clear evidence that over a period of years the majority of girls who have experienced abduction-whether or not receiving programmatic intervention-achieve outcomes that they themselves associated with reintegration. In no way belittling the suff ering associated with confl ict experiences of this nature, this supports a growing literature on the resilience of children and youth in such contexts (Boothby et al. 2006) . Th e policy and programming implications of such fi ndings are that interventions may be appropriately conceived as the means of accelerating existing processes of community healing and recovery rather than serving as the major driver of such processes (Ager et al. 2010b) .
Against this background of a general trend towards reintegration, the SEFAFU program had demonstrable impact in intervention communities (compared to comparison communities) in establishing steady head amongst girls and achieving positive marriage outcomes. Steady head was the most subjective and psychological of the outcomes mapped in this study, and our fi nding thus supports the role of such interventions in fostering mental health and emotional well-being in confl ictaff ected populations. Th is is potentially valuable evidence in support of the approach to such concerns commended by the IASC Guidelines of Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings (IASC 2007) .
As noted, exposure to SEFAFU was also associated with improvements in the rated quality of marriage, with SEFAFU girls who had attained marriage reporting higher quality of marriage partnerships than girls from comparison communities on the criteria of their husbands' provision of clothing and medicine. Th e basis for this diff erence is uncertain, but suggests that exposure to the SEFAFU interventions either supported girls in eff ective negotiation with their husbands over key resources or reduced social stigma that may be a barrier to accessing such resources. Given the vulnerability of young women and girls in post-confl ict settings (Boothby et al. 2006; Conklin and Meier 2008; Stark 2006) this is an important fi nding.
Also, for the girls and young women who had not achieved reintegration outcomes by the time of exposure to SEFAFU-those, it may therefore be assumed, who had experienced the greatest obstacles to reintegration-the intervention was associated with subsequent improvements in bondo engagement, community acceptance and acquisition of steady head. Th e SEFAFU intervention appears, therefore, to have been an eff ective means of overcoming the personal or community obstacles that had previously served as a barrier to such outcomes.
Th e fi ndings of this research are thus an important addition to an evidence-base regarding programming in confl ict and post confl ict settings as the data suggest that interventions such as SEFAFU have the clear potential to improve the lives of girls. Given that the SEFAFU initiative involved a wide range of components, including traditional cleansings, other community events, health screenings, trainings and loans, it is not possible to say which of these elements proved most effective in supporting attainment of reintegration. Indeed, it may have been processes incidental to such specifi c activities (e.g. engaging in discussions with girls, raising the profi le of their needs within communities etc.) that were most signifi cant in creating change. Systematic investigation of the impact of discrete elements and processes involved in interventions is an appropriate next step in strengthening the evidence-base informing programming. However, by whatever means, against a backdrop of wider community recovery, there is clear evidence that exposure to the intervention impacted mental well-being and mar-riage quality and, amongst the most vulnerable girls, further supported bondo engagement and community acceptance-all outcomes that girls themselves had suggested as indicative of 'doing well' back in their community.
Th e study also illustrates the potential for conducting rigorous evaluations in humanitarian settings which often present major constraints on the timeliness and comprehensiveness of initial data collection. Despite the initial lack of clear indicators of reintegration and pre-intervention measures of the circumstances and adjustment of girls and young women, the study design allowed for post-hoc measurement that enabled a clear comparison to be made between those who had received the intervention and those who had not. While promotion of thorough baseline assessment is strategically important for eff ective programming, the development of fl exible evaluation designs that can accommodate the constraints of humanitarian settings remains crucial for the strengthening of the evidence-base for child protection and related interventions (Bamberger et al. 2006; Ager et al. 2010b) . Th e major challenge with the current design was the complexity of the interview protocol and subsequently required statistical analysis. It was not possible to train local staff in the use of the interview protocol because of its complexity and the limited time frame available. Further, the requirement for analysis by a statistical matching procedure further removed implementation of the research from within the capacities of the collaborating NGO. Although this does not infl uence the validity of fi ndings, it does signal the diffi culty of establishing such evaluations as a routine aspect of humanitarian work with typically pre-existing agency capacities. Major capacity development, involving intensive training as well as ongoing support and supervision, is required to make such methodologies accessible as a routine program evaluation tool.
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